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Abstract 
On the basis of examples from mathematical physics, theoretical hypotheses are distinguished 
from generative theories.  An example of the former is Green’s claim that light is the vibrations 
of a certain type of elastic solid.  An example of the later is the wave theory of light.  Both 
hypotheses and theories are characterized in terms of theoretical principles and models, but 
unique to a theory is a language frame for generating its many models.  The aim of theory is 
defined in terms of both accommodating nature and unifying nature through assimilation.  The 
structure and use of generative theories closely resembles the structure of paradigms and their 
use in normal science [Kuhn 1970]. 
 
Introduction 
Our conference topic begins with the statement, “what distinguishes science from all other 
human endeavours is that the accounts of the world that our best, mature sciences deliver are 
strongly supported by evidence and this evidence gives us the strongest reason to believe them.”  
To examine this topic, we need to dive down and address the question of what sorts of accounts 
of the world are intended by science, by theories, and then discuss the extent to which these 
accounts are supported by evidence.  To answer this question, we need to dive down further and 
understand theories, specifically, the aim and structure of theories.  Then we can work our way 
back up and begin to discuss the question of how evidence supports the accounts of the world 
provided by our best theories.  All of the examples in this paper are drawn from mathematical, 
physics theories, which for brevity I will refer to as physical theories. 
We therefore start with a theory about the aim and structure of physical theory, a so-
called theory of theories [see Bromberger 1992].  Just as a physical theory attempts to both fit 
and explain nature, so too, a theory of theories should both fit and explain theories.  To fit, it 
must describe the phenomena, namely, theories, their structure and use.  To explain, it should 
provide an account of why theories are as they are and this can be done by showing that the 
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structure of theory is an outcome of the aims we assign them and the constraints they operate 
within. 
The paper begins by characterizing the aim of physical theory in terms of accommodating 
nature and unifying nature through assimilation.   A distinction between theoretical hypotheses 
and generative theories is then established.  An example of the former is Green’s claim that light 
is the vibrations of a certain type of elastic solid.  An example of the later is the wave theory of 
light.  Both hypotheses and theories are characterized in terms of theoretical principles and 
models, but unique to a theory is a language frame for generating its many models.  The structure 
and use of generative theories closely resembles the structure of paradigms and their use in 
normal science [Kuhn 1970].   
 
The Aim of Physical Theory 
Theories must accommodate nature, or more precisely, our beliefs about nature.  To 
accommodate is “to make fit, to bring into agreement”.  Equally important, theories must 
assimilate nature.  The need to assimilate reflects a human bias.  The world, on the surface 
appears complex and multifarious. Light, heat, sound and the motion of bodies appear as very 
different types of phenomena.  The human intellect is inclined to seek sameness, commonality, at 
a level below appearances, showing that light, heat and sound are manifestations of the same 
sorts of thing.  Though on the surface these phenomena seem quite different, they can be thought 
of as caused by similar mechanisms.  This human inclination is sometimes described as a need to 
systematize or unify the world, though the concept of assimilation better captures the active 
nature of the intellect in making sense of the world.  To ‘systematize’ means to arrange in accord 
with a definite plan or scheme.  To ‘assimilate’ means to make similar—then we arrange 
according to some scheme.2   
 
Three Examples of Theoretical Hypotheses 
I will start with three brief examples of the application of physical theory to nature which 
illustrate the combined use of theoretical principles, models and hypotheses.  Consider Green’s 
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1838 elastic solid theory of light.  Green modeled the luminiferous aether as a strained 
“ordinary” elastic solid.  His account of the reflection of light at a boundary between two optical 
media assumed that the rigidity η of the aether is the same in both media while its inertia ρ has 
different values in the two media.  The general method, used by Green and others at the time, 
was to sufficiently detail a model of the aether so as to obtain a mathematical expression for 
potential energy φ which could then be substituted into the general variational equation: 
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Assuming e to represent the vector displacement of an aethereal particle from its 
equilibrium position, Green obtained a lengthy expression for potential energy φ, which, when 
substituted into the variational equation, results in the following equation of motion: 
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One objective of Green’s theory was to derive Fresnel’s sine and tangent laws of 
reflection.  Fresnel’s laws describe the ratio of the amplitude of reflected to incident light when 
light is incident on a planar surface separating two isotropic media.  The sine law applies when 
the incident light is polarized in the plane of incidence and the tangent law when polarized 
perpendicular to the plane of incidence:3   
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With the above theoretical assumptions, Green also derived the boundary conditions that 
must be satisfied at the interface between real elastic solids, which state that, along the interface 
between the two media, the three components of displacement and the three components of stress 
must be equal.  After analyzing the reflection and refraction of an incident wave Green found 
that if the vibration of the aethereal molecules is at right angles to the plane of incidence, the 
intensity of the reflected light obeys Fresnel’s sine law. 
In 1856 Krönig developed a version of the kinetic theory of gases based on a simple 
model of a gas as consisting of a vast number of atoms that behave like solid, perfectly elastic 
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spheres moving with definite velocities.  One objective of kinetic theory is to derive the specific 
heats of gases, which is defined in terms of the heat energy E required to raise the temperature T 
of the gas.  Cv is the specific heat when volume is constant and is defined as: 
T
ECv ∂
∂
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The principle of equipartition of energy states that for a substance in thermal equilibrium 
its energy is equally divided between the degrees of freedom of its molecules, that is, between its 
translational, rotational and vibrational degrees of freedom.  Previous results indicated that a 
mole of gas has RT/2 units of energy per degree of molecular freedom where R is the universal 
gas constant.  If we define t, r and v as the degrees of translational, rotational and vibrational 
degrees of freedom, we obtain the following expression for the energy in one mole of a gas: 
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Substituting this expression for E into the previous equation for Cv and taking a simple 
derivative results in the following expression for Cv: 
2/)2( RvrtCv ++=  
The model described by Krönig has no rotational or vibrational degrees of freedom, only 
three degrees of translational freedom; hence, Cv for this model is 3R/2.   
Consider one last example, one which brings quantum theory into the discussion.  
Imagine that our objective is to derive the energy levels of some gas with wave mechanics.  The 
central theoretical principle of wave mechanics is Schrödinger’s equation: 
ψψ EH =
 
A general procedure for deriving the energy spectrum of a system with wave mechanics 
is to first construct a model, obtain the Hamiltonian H for the model, substitute the Hamiltonian 
into Schrödinger’s equation and then solve this equation to obtain the energy eigenvalues of the 
system.   
The rigid rotator model provides a relatively simple illustration.  It consists of two masses 
m1 and m2 connected by a mass-less rod of length r, with moment of inertia I and angular 
momentum operator L. The Hamiltonian H operator associated with the rigid rotator is L2/2I, 
which, when expanded in polar coordinates takes the form: 
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Substituting this expression for H into Schrödinger’s equation, followed by a complex 
mathematical derivation, leads to the following expression for the quantized energy values of the 
system: 
IJJE j 2/)1( 2h+=  
 
Theoretical Principles, Models and Hypotheses 
These three examples illustrate a common pattern.  In the case of Green’s theory, the 
variational principle is applied through a specific elastic solid model.   In Krönig’s theory, the 
principle of equipartition of energy is applied through a simple gas model.  In the wave 
mechanics example, Schrödinger’s equation was applied through the rigid rotator model.  Said 
differently, the models were designed with an eye towards applying the principles and 
mathematical assumptions of the theory [see Cartwright 1983].  These three examples illustrate 
what I will refer to as theoretical hypotheses, a notion which depends on an understanding of 
theoretical principles and theoretical models. 
Examples of theoretical principles include the principles of conservation of energy and 
momentum, Newton’s laws of motion, Schrödinger’s equation, the variational principle and 
Maxwell’s equations.  First, these principles are fundamental in the sense that there is no attempt 
to reduce them to, or derive them from, more fundamental principles; instead, they serve as the 
foundation for almost all derivations of their respective theories.  Second, at least in 
mathematical physics, they are symbolic in form and have variables as placeholders for 
mathematical expressions of potential energy, force, the Hamiltonian of a system and the like.   
And finally, theoretical principles are used by all members of the theoretical without any need 
for justification.  Conversely, we might say that membership in the community is defined in 
terms of acceptance of these principles. 
Because of the multiple meanings of model, theoretical models are two-sided, both 
models of the theory and models of the world.  They are models of the theory in the sense that 
they satisfy the theoretical and mathematical statements of the theory.  Cartwright [1983] and 
Giere [1988] have discussed this aspect of theoretical models. Giere writes, “I propose we regard 
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the simple harmonic oscillator and the like as abstract entities having all and only the properties 
ascribed to them in standard textbooks” [1988, p. 78].  
Properties are assigned to models with an eye towards engaging a theory’s inferential 
mechanisms, namely, its theoretical principles and mathematical tools.  Our three examples are 
based on models that have clearly been designed to engage theoretical principles.  Green’s 
elastic solid model, described in terms of particles displaced from their equilibrium position, is 
constructed so as to yield an expression for potential energy that can then be substituted into the 
variational equation.  Gas models used to derive specific heats clearly indicate values for 
translational, rotational and vibrational degrees of freedom which are then substituted for r, v 
and t in the equation describing the energy of the system.  Finally, the rigid rotator model and all 
of the models of wave mechanics are designed so as to yield an expression for the Hamiltonian 
of the system, which can then be substituted into Schrödinger’s equation.  At the same time, 
models are designed with idealizations like point masses and perfect elasticity so as to satisfy the 
mathematical needs of the theory.   
Models should actually be understood as three-sided, as models of the world, of the 
theory’s principles and mathematics, but also, as models of a generative language frame.  But we 
will postpone a discussion of this third side of models until we turn to an analysis of theories.  
Up to this point, we have only been talking about theoretical hypotheses.  
Models become models of the world through theoretical hypotheses.  Our three examples 
are illustrations of theoretical hypotheses, although, they might also be referred to as theories, for 
example, Green’s 1838 elastic solid theory of light.  But, for reasons that will become apparent, 
it is better to reserve the term theory for the likes of the wave theory of light, the kinetic theory 
of gases and the quantum theory of molecular spectroscopy, and regard our the above examples 
as possible hypotheses of these theories.  A theoretical hypothesis is therefore a statement that 
asserts a model as representational of some aspect of the world such that conclusions drawn from 
the model should reflect their parallel in the world.  Examples include the statements “light is the 
vibrations of a Greenian elastic solid” and “hydrogen gas consists of atoms described by Bohr’s 
model”.  Unlike a stand alone model, a theoretical hypothesis can be evaluated. 
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Illustrations of Generative Theories 
The wave theory of light is consistent with conflicting theoretical hypotheses about light 
just as kinetic theory is consistent with many conflicting hypotheses about the same type of gas.  
Such options are generated from the internal structure of these theories, on, what I will 
eventually characterize in terms of generative language frames.  But first, I will provide some 
historical background on the use of generative theories. 
 One objective of kinetic theory, as applied to some gas, is the derivation of its specific 
heat.  Historically, a physicist may have considered two types of options when confronted with 
this problem, one based on vortex models, the other on “billiard ball” type models.  Rankine and 
others championed vortex models which portrayed atoms as a nucleus, enveloped by a rotating 
elastic atmosphere which is retained in place by attractive forces of the nucleus.  As the heat of a 
gas is increased the rotational kinetic energy and centrifugal force increase, thus increasing 
pressure. There were several types of vortex models just as there were many variations of 
“billiard ball” models, Krönig’s model being the simplest of this type of model.   
The particles of Krönig’s simple model have only three degrees of motion, namely, 
translation in three directions.  But in 1857, Clausius, in reflecting upon Krönig’s model, 
imagined more complex models that would exhibit both rotational and translational degrees of 
freedom.  In modern terms, he imagined rigid rotators, and particles attached by “springs”, which 
exhibit various degrees of freedom, and result in a variety of values for specific heat using the 
following equation: 
2/)2( RvrtCv ++=  
Further variations of the “billiard ball” type of model were developed in the process of 
fitting the kinetic theory to experiment.  Jeans, for example, considered the implications of 
molecules that can aggregate with one another and assumed that in raising the temperature of a 
gas, work is not only done in increasing the energy of its individual molecules but also in 
separating them, which, if the case, would increase predicted values of Cv.  Likewise, Maxwell 
considered particle shape and modeled gases with different ratios of spherical and non-spherical 
particles, and depending on the assumed ratio, computed different values for the specific heat of 
a gas. 
The above options provide these theories with many models and theorists with many 
possible hypotheses when confronting a problem.  If a specific hypothesis fails to accommodate 
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experimental results, then an alternative can be developed, without in the process calling into 
question the theory or its basic principles.  But, foreshadowing a question we will return to, how 
does the community reach consensus about what are, and what are not, legitimate hypotheses of 
the theory.  After all, we can not understand theories or their evaluation, without answering this 
question.   
An illustration of the question of legitimacy, of standards, is found in the context of the 
classical theory of light, our second example of a generative physical theory.  Green’s elastic 
solid model of light, though successful in deriving Fresnel’s sine law of reflection, was 
inconsistent with Fresnel’s tangent law of reflection.  Eventually MacCullagh [1839] developed 
an elastic solid model of light consistent with both laws of reflection as well as the absence of 
longitudinal waves.  But to illustrate the issue of hypothesis legitimacy, let us begin with 
MacCullagh’s paper of 1837.  Mathematically, this paper achieved similar results to his paper of 
1839, but it was “without dynamical” foundation.  In particular, MacCullagh’s 1837 paper was 
based on assumptions about the boundary conditions between two optical media that are violated 
in the case of an ordinary elastic solid (such as Green’s).  This would not have been a problem if 
MacCullagh had backed his mathematical assumption with a model that provided dynamical 
foundation for the alleged boundary conditions.  But he did not, and recognizing this deficiency 
himself, concluded that his 1837 paper amounted to nothing more than fortunate conjecture 
without any theoretical foundation. 
MacCullagh’s 1839 model, however, provided a dynamical foundation for the 
assumptions of his 1837 conjecture.  He assumed a new type of elastic solid, one whose potential 
energy depends only on the rotation of its volume elements.  Substituting the expression for 
potential energy into the variational equation led to an elegant expression for the equation of 
motion that describes purely transverse waves and is consistent with both of Fresnel’s laws of 
reflection:  
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About MacCullagh’s work, Whittaker concludes, “there can be no doubt that MacCullagh 
really solved the problem of devising a medium whose vibrations, calculated in accordance with 
the correct laws of dynamics, should have the same properties as the vibrations of light” [1989, 
p. 144].  Nonetheless, MacCullagh’s solution was not immediately embraced because of 
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questions concerning its legitimacy and whether it adhered to required standards.  Although, on 
the surface, the notion of a rotationally elastic solid offered some dynamical foundation for his 
mathematical assumptions, MacCullagh failed to describe a mechanical model that illustrated the 
dependence of potential energy on rotation.  In 1889, Thomson (Lord Kelvin), addressed this 
concern, and constructed, not simply in thought, a mechanical system consisting of spheres, rigid 
bars, and spherical caps, which illustrated the concept of rotational elasticity.  
While it is not actually necessary to actually build a physical model in order to legitimate 
a theoretical model, something is needed in order to justify an equation; after all, one can not 
simply write down any equation, derive a desired result, and declare success in the sense of 
having solved a problem with a theory.  But we have started our discussion of the classical 
theory of light down in the details; let us bring the discussion up a few levels and paint a broader 
picture of this generative theory and then return to the question of standards. 
One objective of the classical theory of light was to fit various experimental results, 
including those relating to reflection, refraction and polarization.  But the first order of business 
was to simply account for the fact that light travels from one place to another in a finite duration.  
Broadly conceived, there were two basic responses to this aim which divided the theory into two 
major versions, the corpuscular and wave theories of light.  From the perspective of classical 
mechanics, one could think of light as like a dart, or a projectile, that travels from one place to 
another.  Or one could think of light as traveling as a progressive disturbance that initiates with 
the agitation of some particles, which communicate the disturbance to neighboring particles, 
which in turn agitate their neighboring particles, and so forth.  Newton and Laplace were 
advocates of corpuscular hypotheses, while Young, Fresnel, Stokes, Green, MacCullagh, 
Thomson and others developed versions of the wave theory of light. 
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Figure 1 Tree diagram, evolution path for classical theory of light 
 
Through a process similar to evolution and natural selection (figure 1), alternative 
hypotheses of the classical theory of light were developed and tested for fitness with respect to 
experimental results. Combined requirements relating to reflection, refraction, polarization and 
other experimental results, eventually gave preference to the wave theory of light, more 
specifically, to the transverse wave theory of light.  The assumption of a transverse wave theory 
of light was quickly translated into the need for elastic solid models since it was known that such 
a medium could support transverse waves.  Finally, many hypotheses of the elastic solid theory 
of light were developed, based on various options, such as those relating to the rigidity and 
inertia of the medium. 
 
Expectations of a Theory of Theories 
I will argue that the kinetic theory of heat and the classical theory of light are generative 
theories and that such theories consist of theoretical principles, theoretical hypotheses and a 
mechanism for generating (and legitimating) the models of the theory.  But before detailing this 
response, we need to understand the criteria for judging a theory of theories.  After all, just like a 
physical theory, a theory of theories should be evaluated according to some recognized 
standards, and following the example of physical theory, it is appropriate that a theory of theories 
fit and explain theories.  
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In the case of a theory of theories, what we are fitting is a practice, known to us through 
historical documents and textbooks.  Any such account of physical theory had better take 
account of the use of theoretical principles, theoretical models and mathematical derivation.  But 
it also needs to capture standards of practice, and the fact that members of the community, in 
understanding a theory, have criteria for agreeing on what is, and what is not, a legitimate 
expression of the theory.  Kuhn emphasizes this point in writing, “No puzzle-solving enterprise 
can exist unless its practitioners share criteria which, for that group and for that time, determine 
when a particular puzzle has been solved” [293].  This does not mean that practitioners must 
agree on which model to use for a given problem.  But there must be criteria, shared by the 
community, for deciding what counts as solving a problem.  Although these standards may not 
be clear cut rules, as evidenced by the debate about the legitimacy of MacCullagh’s rotationally 
elastic solid theory, without something in this role, a sort of anarchy would ensue.   
Likewise, a theory about physical theories will ideally explain specific instances of 
physical theory, just as kinetic theory aims to explain the specific heat of a gas by showing it as 
the outcome of some underlying mechanism. So too, a theory of theories should explain the 
structure and use of theories as a consequence of their aims and the constraints they operate 
within.    
 
The Structure of Generative Theories 
Earlier I described theoretical hypotheses in terms of theoretical models, governed by 
theoretical principles and mathematics.  These concepts are also essential to understanding 
generative theories, but something in addition is needed to capture a theory’s mechanism for 
generating and legitimating its models.   
According to Kuhn, models supply the group with “preferred or permissible analogies 
and metaphors” which “help to determine what will be accepted as an explanation and as a 
puzzle-solution” [1970, 184].  Directionally this seems correct, but I believe the concept of 
generative language frames, as developed by Barsalou [1992] and others might provide a better 
framework for what Kuhn was after here.  More work needs to be done in this area, but I will 
sketch a role for language frames in the context of generative physical theories.   
Figure 2 illustrates a modified version of a language frame given by Barsalou for the 
category car.  Barsalou describes several features and uses for language frames but I will only 
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focus on those features which seem particularly suited to an analysis of the structure of physical 
theory, namely, attributes and values, the concept of a model of a language frame, exemplars, the 
enablement relation, and the idea that the choice of a specific model of a language frame is goal 
driven. 
 
Figure 2 Generative language frame for car category 
 
Figure 2 illustrates various attributes of car and their possible values. The concept of 
enablement is also illustrated and in this case reflects the fact that automatic transmission is an 
enabler for remote start but standard transmission is not.  Shading is used to identify a specific 
instantiation of the language frame, in this case, a green, six cylinder, standard transmission, 
gasohol fueled car that Sarah will drive.  Barsalou defines an exemplar as an instantiated frame, 
in which case, the car defined about would be an exemplar.  I would prefer to use the term model 
for any instantiation of a frame, and reserve the term exemplar for special instantiations, special 
models, those that have particular significance.  A model of a language frame is therefore a 
model in the sense in which an ideal spring is a model of certain theoretical equations.  The car 
model selected above has all, and only, those attributes and values assigned to it. 
Specific models of a frame result from a series of choices.  These choices should be seen 
as goal driven.  The selected car model reflects a compromise between a desire for quickness, 
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environmentalism and comfort.  The standard transmission is optimal for quickness, and good 
for gas consumption, but it implies that the car can not have remote start.  The choice of a six 
cylinder engine reflects a compromise between miles per gallon and quickness, and gasohol was 
selected because of environmental commitment.  
Language frames provide a useful medium for representing model generation in the 
context of physical theories.  Choices within the language frame of a physical theory, as well as 
the specification of the language frame itself, are goal driven. First, models of the language 
frame must be suited to application of the theory’s principles and mathematics.  Second, the 
selection of a specific model of the frame will be guided by the goal of solving a given problem, 
for example, deriving the energy spectrum of some gas.  And finally, and we will discuss this 
more later, the goal is to not overly inflate the frame and allow too many model types. 
Consider a language frame for the kinetic theory of heat.  Within the frame, alternative 
models result from a series of choices, and, as we will see, a very similar frame is used by 
various quantum theories, such as quantum theory of molecular spectra.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Partial language frames for particle system and particle 
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Figure 3 illustrates a partial frame for particle system and particle.  The attributes of 
particle system include number of particles, arrangement and modes of interaction between 
particles.  The attributes of particle include mass, elasticity, size and shape.  Attribute and value 
decisions are constrained by the requirements of applying the theory’s principles and 
mathematics as well as the goal of accommodating nature.  For the time being we will assume a 
fixed frame and hold off on discussion of expanding the frame so as to accommodate anomalies 
or additional types of phenomena.  
In the particle frame, color has been crossed out because, unlike the other attributes, it is 
irrelevant with respect to the assumed principles of kinetic theory.  These principles require 
models defined in terms of mass, elasticity, size, shape and the like.  Likewise, the mathematical 
needs of the theory are captured by selection of attributes and values that lend themselves to 
mathematical derivation, such as point masses, and perfect elasticity.  The concept of enablement 
is essential here because some attribute values are only permitted if other attributes have certain 
values.  If, for example, the number of particles in the system is two, then a triangular 
arrangement of particles is not permitted.  If, on the other hand, a three particle system is 
selected, then there are three choices as to arrangement— point, linear, and triangular.   A 
specific model of the combined language frames, in this case, a rigid rotator model, is identified 
by shading specific attribute values—the key attribute values are two particles, rigid rod 
connection and linear arrangement. 
Figure 4 illustrates some of the models that can be generated with these simple language 
frames as well as the values of specific heat obtained with these models.  Although the frame is 
simple, permutations of its attribute values allow for many models and values of Cv, even more if 
other attributes are exploited.  Maxwell, through consideration of the attribute of particle shape, 
imagined different ratios of spherical and non-spherical particles and was able to predict a 
continuous range for Cv between some interval. 
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Figure 4 Models, degrees of freedom and specific heats 
 
Not all frames are so easily deciphered and constructed.   This frame happens to lend 
itself to a sort of “tinker-toy” interpretation, such that the models of the frame are objects one 
could build with rigid rods, springs and spheres.  But the critical point here is that there must be 
something that plays this role, the role of identifying legitimate expressions of the theory.   
 
Structure of Generative Theories Revisited 
To summarize up to this point, a generative theory consists of theoretical principles, a 
language frame for generating the theory’s models, and a set of theoretical hypotheses that, 
somewhat artificially, reflect the intent of the theory at some point in time.  This statement 
requires two points of clarification.  First, theoretical models were previously described as two 
sided, as models of the world and as models of theoretical equations.  But theoretical models are 
also models of the generative language frame assumed by a theory.  Second, a generative theory 
is not simply a tool for hypothesizing about the world, but, as a theory about the world, it must 
also assume theoretical hypotheses.  We have seen that generative theories are consistent with 
many hypotheses about the same phenomenon, for example, about the mechanisms underlying 
the propagation of light and the specific heat of a gas.  Hence, to associate a generative theory 
with any given set of hypotheses is somewhat arbitrary, but aimed at capturing the preferred, 
perhaps exemplary, hypotheses of the theory at some point in time.  Figure 5 summarizes the 
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structure and use of generative theories.  The activity described characterizes normal science and 
the current analysis of generative theories is proposed as a further detailing of Kuhn’s concept of 
a paradigm.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Feedback diagram for generative theory testing (paradigms and normal science) 
 
We start with a specific problem (or puzzle), for example, to derive the specific heat of 
hydrogen or the reflection of polarized light.  Next, a specific model of the language frame is 
selected, which then becomes a model of the theory’s principles and mathematics.  A theoretical 
hypothesis can then be formulated, for example, light is the vibrations of a certain type of elastic 
solid.  The theoretical model is then set in motion by the theory’s principles and mathematics.  
The first step is typically writing down a mathematical version of a key theoretical principle, 
such as the variational equation, f=ma or Schrödinger’s equation.  The result is a specific version 
of one of these equations.  Mathematical, theoretical derivation proceeds and implications of the 
hypothesis are drawn which are compared with experimental results.  Success implies that the 
community can move onto another problem in an effort to assimilate more of nature to the 
generative theory (or paradigm).  In addition, the theoretical hypothesis might be given 
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exemplary status in the theory’s literature just as the stand alone model might be dubbed an 
exemplar and given a section in standard textbooks.  Failure typically results in returning to the 
language frame to select an alternative model, a selection that will be informed by previous 
failures.  A critical experiment that appears to implicate the entire language frame may imply 
that there is no point in returning to the language frame in search of a better model. 
 
But success, or the criterion for success, needs clarification.  In upper right corner of 
figure 5 there is reference to evaluation of a hypothesis in terms of consistency with the 
hypotheses of other theories.  For example, do we need to worry about the interaction of the 
molecules of kinetic theory with an elastic solid that pervades all space?  Likewise, astronomy 
tells us that the planets are not appreciably slowing down as they move through space, but if an 
aether fills all of space, then classical mechanics implies that the planets should slow down over 
time.  One might object that this sort of reasoning implies that we are taking models too literally 
and are not reflecting the theory’s intended account of the world.  One might argue that what we 
were really after here was the equations for an elastic solid and not the hypothesis that there 
really is an elastic solid occupying all space.  I will counter this objection by arguing that by 
disassociating theoretical models from the language frames they originated within, a theory fails 
to assimilate and unify nature.  But first, let us consider how theories do in fact assimilate and 
unify nature.   
 
Generative Theories and Assimilation  
While Newton’s laws and Schrödinger’s equation are critical to any account of how 
classical and quantum theories unify nature, by themselves, these principles are impotent when it 
comes to unifying nature.  For the sake of argument, imagine theories without recourse to 
language frames and their models.  Different applications of f=ma and Schrödinger’s equation 
require different versions of these equations, in the end, in order to solve a variety of problems, 
many mathematical versions of these equations are required.  Figure 6 shows just a few of the 
many versions of f=ma and Schrödinger’s equation.   
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Figure 6 Mathematical versions of f=ma and Schrödinger’s equation 
 
Without recourse to the semantic content of models, we have two options for capturing 
the systematic unification of nature by theories.  One option is to derive these equations from 
some smaller set of more fundamental principles.  As an example of this exercise, consider the 
four mathematical versions of Schrödinger’s equation shown in figure 6, and try to derive them 
from a smaller number of equations.  A second option is to list all of these equations as 
fundamental, but then the theory has too many “fundamental principles” and fails to somehow 
reduce the many to the few.     
Assimilation is not achieved not through mathematic derivation of many equations from a 
few equations; rather, it is achieved through the semantic content of models.  The equations of a 
theory should be seen as versions of a handful of fundamental principles, and though each 
version is based on a unique model, the models are similar in terms of semantic content, that is, 
are instantiations of a common language frame.  The result is a small number of fundamental 
principles that govern a large number of models that are all similar in the sense that they stem 
from a common language frame.  In this way, theories assimilate the multifarious surface 
phenomena to deeper, but similar, causal mechanisms.   
To summarize the dependence of theories on models, models are indispensable to theory 
and should not be thought of as scaffolding that can be removed once a theory is constructed.  
Hertz wrote, “Maxwell’s theory is Maxwell’s equations”.  The aether models are superfluous.  In 
the end, that appears to be true, but for that reason, Maxwell did not assimilate electromagnetic 
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phenomena to classical mechanics.  He introduced a different language frame, one based on 
fields, as well a new set of theoretical principles.  Metaphorically, models are critical to 
assimilation and provide the organic matter that unites the symbolic expressions of a theory.  
Poincare offers a lovely metaphor which, though used with different intent, can be seen as 
describing the mathematical equations of a theory after their models are removed: 
. . . You have doubtless seen those delicate assemblages of 
silicious needles which form the skeleton of certain sponges. When 
the organic matter has disappeared, there remains only a frail and 
delicate lacework, True, nothing is there but the silica, but what is 
interesting is the form this silica has taken, and we could not 
understand it if we did not know the living sponge which has given 
it precisely this form.  
 
Accommodation versus Assimilation Trade-offs 
The aims of accommodating and assimilating nature pull theories in opposite directions.  
They do so for two reasons, one of which is obvious, the other more subtle.   
Assimilation is optimized if the theory’s language frame and cast of models is limited.  
At one extreme is a language frame similar to that of Descartes’ physics, limited to particles of 
different sizes and shapes, where the only type of force admitted is that due to collision.  The 
metaphor is very restrictive and judging from history unable to fit diverse phenomena.  To better 
accommodate the world, the language is given more freedom, perhaps initially allowing for 
different degrees of elasticity or types of interactions beyond collision.  1/r forces might be added 
to the language frame as possible values for the particle to particle interaction attribute.  The 
acceptance of new attributes, or new attribute values, may require a change in standards.  Kuhn 
makes this point in writing, “Must a theory of motion explain the cause of the attractive forces 
between particles of matter or may it simply note the existence of such forces?  Newton’s 
dynamics was widely rejected because, unlike both Aristotle’s and Descartes’ theories, it implied 
the latter answer to the question.  When Newton’s theory had been accepted, a question was 
therefore banished from science” [1970, p. 148]. But in loosening standards in this manner, 
assimilation is compromised in order to better accommodate nature.  
Accommodation and assimilation, however, can interact in a more subtle way.  While the 
semantic content of models provides the grounds for assimilation, it also endows models with the 
means for interacting with other beliefs and this can get hypotheses into trouble.  If the aether is 
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an elastic solid then that means it is a resistive medium that should interact with planetary motion 
and the molecules of kinetic theory.  Stokes addressed this concern by likening the aether to an 
extreme example of substances like “shoemaker’s wax” which is rigid enough to permit elastic 
vibration, but plastic enough to allow others bodies to pass slowly through it.  Stokes’ proposal 
may provide a solution to this problem, but MacCullagh and others did not endow their models 
with these properties and then show that the resulting hypothesis was consistent with the 
observed motion of planets as well as Fresnel’s laws of reflection and the absence of longitudinal 
light waves.  
Likewise, in the end, advocates of kinetic theory overlooked an apparent conflict between 
their hypotheses and the assumption of an aether.  In the early part of the nineteenth century 
many physicists believed in a luminiferous aether and were therefore reluctant to advance a 
kinetic theory of heat because they suspected an inconsistency between the two theories.  
Clausius was one of the first physicists to overcome this reluctance and as a consequence he was 
critical to the early development of kinetic theory.  In general, physicists often ignore conflicts 
between the hypotheses of different theories and one can imagine several reasons why this is the 
case.  One reason is that the task of fitting nature with theories is hard enough already.  
But the question remains as to whether these conflicts should be overlooked, or expressed 
differently, how should we understand the intended accounts of our best theories?  Earlier I 
mentioned that one might object that concerns about, for instance, the consistency between the 
kinetic theory of gases and the assumption of an aether, suggest that models are being taken too 
literally.  In response, I argue that we can not have it both ways—rely on the semantic content of 
models in order to make a case for assimilation, and ignore semantic content when it interacts 
with other hypotheses and makes fitting nature more difficult.4 
 
Explaining Generative Theories 
Finally, I turn to the questions of why and must physical theories look like this.  Can we 
imagine other alternatives, theories constructed in different ways, which achieve similar goals?  
                                                 
4
 It is interesting that while philosophers worry about underdetermination, physicists 
neglect to consider interactions between their theories that could “further determine them”. 
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While not prepared to address this question in its entirety, I will at least attempt an argument for 
the necessity of models and language frames. 
It is important to acknowledge that language frames and their models have a primary and 
secondary role in the context of physical theory.  Their primary role relates to assimilation and 
the goal of showing many phenomena as consequences of similar sorts of mechanisms that are 
governed by a small number of basic principles.  And because of this role, language frames and 
their models establish standards that are used to identify what are legitimate expressions of a 
theory.   
It is not necessary for theories to assume models in the sense of familiar pictures, for 
example, cogs, wheels, pulleys and springs.  The theoretical models of quantum theory certainly 
challenge the imagination.  But this is after the principles and mathematics of the theory have 
imposed their requirements on these models.  Models start as models of a familiar language 
frame.  After they are then further characterized by theoretical principles like Schrödinger’s 
equation and the mathematics of quantum theory, we can certainly lose sight of the model.  But 
we should not lose sight of their origin as models of a familiar language frame.  There is a 
tendency to think of modern physics as free of models.  This point of view is echoed by Dirac’s 
proclamation that quantum theory has no dependence on what can be perceived, talked about, 
and that one should simply stick with the equations, the mathematics.  Even in quantum theory 
there is a familiar language that serves as the origin for its models, without which, the theory 
would not assimilate any more than a long list of equations. 
The language frames of classical and quantum theory have much in common.  In fact, the 
language frame previously illustrated for classical kinetic theory is remarkable similar to that 
used in the quantum theory of specific heats and the quantum theory of molecular spectroscopy.  
A cursory study of Herzberg’s “The Spectra and Structure of Simple Free Radicals” reveals a 
language frame built on particle systems consisting of varying numbers of particles, arranged in 
different ways and connected by the likes of abstract rigid rotators and ideal springs.  The models 
of the language frame exhibit different rotational, vibrational and electronic states.  When the 
models then become models of the principles and equations of quantum theory so as to derive 
transition probabilities and line spectra, indeed, the models become rather peculiar.  But we 
should not lose sight of their origin in a familiar language frame. 
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Atavism 
In order to fit nature, theories require many variations of their theoretical principles.  
Unification of nature, through assimilation, is achieved by recognizing these equations as 
versions of a handful of fundamental principles, and though each version is based on a unique 
model, the models are similar in terms of semantic content, that is, they are instantiations of a 
common language frame.  Quine [1953], in Two Dogmas of Empiricism remarks that “language 
is social and so depends for its development upon intersubjective reference”.  The reliance of 
theories on language, and the dependence of language on intersubjective reference, implies that 
generative physical theories are necessarily atavistic and dependent on something more primitive 
than themselves.  Models, originating in everyday experiences with the mid-sized objects of 
intersubjective reference, keep reappearing-- in classical mechanics, in the classical theories of 
light, heat and sound, and finally in quantum mechanics.  On the topic of philosophical atavism, 
Nietzsche wrote: 
 …. the most diverse philosophers unfailingly fill out again and 
again a certain basic scheme of possible philosophies.  Under an 
invisible spell they always trace once more the identical orbit: 
however independent of one another they may feel [1990, p. 20]. 
Whether or not this is true of philosophy, something like this occurs in physics.  Modern 
theories are more dependent on ancient ideas than we might prefer to recognize.  But the orbit 
theories trace is certainly not identical.  What reappears are not theoretical models but only 
models in the more limited sense of models as models of a language frame.  Theoretical models 
are both models of a language frame and models of a theory’s principles and mathematics and 
progress requires that they change from one theory to the next. 
 
Conclusions 
What distinguishes science from all other human endeavours is that the accounts of the 
world that our best, mature sciences deliver are strongly supported by evidence and this evidence 
gives us the strongest reason to believe them.   
I have barely reached the point at which the topic of theory confirmation can be 
addressed, but hopefully I have provided a framework that might be useful in this context.  In 
approaching the issue of theory evaluation and confirmation, it is important to contrast the 
testing of theoretical hypotheses with the testing of a generative theory.   
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Theoretical hypotheses, such as Green’s elastic solid hypothesis about light, can easily be 
reconstructed as derivations where consequents are mechanically derived from antecedents; 
hence, if consequents do not agree with experiment, the hypothesis is in trouble. For pragmatic 
reasons the principles and mathematics are typically exempt from questioning, and the models 
are the preferred victim [Quine 1953].  But, given that these hypotheses are the hypotheses of a 
broader theory, which aims at assimilating nature, the semantic content of their models is 
essential and interaction with other beliefs, other theories, must be reconciled—but only if 
theories are to both accommodate and unify nature through assimilation.  
On the other hand, failure of generative theories is less obvious and the traditional 
contexts of discovery and justification become intertwined as discovering, creating new models, 
is integral to the evaluation of these theories.  Finally, it is important to recognize everything that 
is tested when we evaluate a generative theory.  We are testing theoretical principles and 
mathematics, but we are also testing the suitability of a familiar language to simultaneously 
accommodate and assimilate nature. 
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